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CASENOTES
under state law20 as to the recoverability of any tax so paid, to require the
prepayment of the tax as a requisite to testing any substantial questions
involved, or to insist that the petitioner carry on his activities without the
required license and face the risk of penal sanctions, would be to place too
great a burden upon him.

It was concluded that these considerations

eliminated the statutory prohibition and established sufficient threat of

irretrievable loss, so as to justify federal intervention. This decision is in
conformity with the established rule which provides that even though there
may be a remedy provided in the state, if it is inadequate, the petitioner
may seek relief in the federal courts. It was apparent that the respondent
attempted to restrict tile growth of labor unions in its city. The petitioner
had a right to engage in this activity. To insist that the peitioner seek the

remedy provided would effectively deprive him of this right. By deciding
that they had jurisdiction, the court arrived at the only just conclusion.
EDWARD S. JAFFRY

REAL PROPERTY-MECHANICS' LIENS-LIABILITY
OF LESSOR FOR LESSEE'S IMPROVEMENTS
A lessee under a long term lease caused inprovments to be made upon
the leased premises. Subsequently, the lessee was evicted owing to a breach
of conditions contained in the lease. Various mechanics' lienors sought to

20. "There is no general statute in Georgia affording a taxpayer a remedy for the
recovery of taxes illegally or erroneously assessed, except as herein before quoted freferring to GA. CoDE § 20-1007 (4317) (1933)]." State Revenue Comm. v. Alexander,
54 Ga. App. 295, 187 S.E. 707, 709 (1936). The petitioner's right to recover depends
completely on an interpretation and compliance with the Code of Georgia, supra,
providing:
Voluntary payments; recovery back-Payments of taxes or their claims, made
through ignorance of the law, or where the facts are all known and there is no
misplaced confidence and no artifice, deception or fraudulent practice used by
the other party, are deemed volintary, and cannot be recovered back, unless
made under an urgent and immediate lecCssity therefor, or to release a person
or property from detention, or to prevent an immediate seizure of person or
property. Filing a protest at the time of payment does not change this rule.
Thus, in Strachnan Shipping Co. v. Savannah, 168 Ga. 309, 147 S.E. 555 (1929),
it was held that payment of taxes through fear of criminal prosecution, where no warrants
had been issued and no prosecution commenced and there existed no demands or threats
by persons with the authority to carry them out, are voluntary and not recoverable. See
also Eibel v. Royal Indemnity Co., 50 Ga. App. 206, 177 S.E. 350 (1934) (where an
officer, not authorized to issue a warrant, notified the taxpayer that if he did not make
payment he would be arrested, and payment was made because of the threats, the payment was considered voluntary and not recoverable); Southern Stevedoring Co. v.
Savannah, 36 Ga. 526, 137 S.E. 123 (1927) (wherein it was held that an allegation in
taxpayer's petition that unless he paid the required occupation tax the city marshall would
be notified and plaintiff prosecuted, alleged only a mere possibility of prosecution, and
showed no immediate duress which would necessitate a payment in order to prevent
immediate seizure of person or property); accord, Goodwin v. McNeil, 188 Ga. 182, 3
S.E.2d 675 (1939) (a fine paid to avoid imprisonment after a conviction which was
later reversed, was held to be.a voluntary payment and not recoverable).

MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
enforce their liens. Held, although the lease did not specifically require the
lessee to improve, there was a contemplation of improvements in the lease
sufficient to cause the liens to attach to the lessor's interest.' Anderson v.
Sokolik, 88 So.2d 511 (Fla. 1956).
A valid lien against a lessee's interest in real property will not be extended to operate against the estate of the lessor, unless the lessee is the
agent 3 or other statutory representative' of the lessor, or, unless the lessor
has given his consent to or otherwise authorized the improvements made
by the lessee.5 Statutes vary in this regard but may be categorized into
two general types: those requiring a contract with the lessor or his agent"
(without regard to the element of consent); and those allowing a lien to
7
be predicated on the owner's express or implied consent.
Under the contract type statute, the courts have generally held that
the lessee is not the agent of the lessor merely by virtue of the relationship

STAT. § 84.03(2) (1955)
I. when an improvement is made by a lessee, in accordance with a contract
between such lessee and his lessor, liens shall extend also to the interest of such
lessor. . ..
2. The Mechanics' Lien Statute provides that "owner" means the owner of realty,
or any interest therein, who enters into a contract for the improvement of the realty.
Therefore, "owner" applies to a lessee who contracts for the improvement of leased
property, as well as to a fee simple title holder who so contracts. FLA. SrAT. § 84.01
(1955); Lehigh Structural Steel Co. v. Joseph Langner, Inc., 43 So.2d 335 (Fla. 1949);
Cf. Stowers v. Wheat, 78 F.2d 25 (5th Cir. 1927).
3. Lehigh Structural Steel Co. v. Joseph Langner, Inc., Supra note 2: "tijt is
generally held . . . that a lessor who requires his lessee to construct an improvement on
the leased property may in certain instances thereby constitute the lessee his agent for
that purpose .... "; see also Donald v. Heigel Lumber Co., 187 Ark. 1014, 63 S.XV.2d 646
(1933); Robert L. Weed, Architect, Inc. v. Horning, 159 Fla. 847, 33 So.2d 648
(1947): "The rule appears to be general that when a lease requires the lessee to construct improvements . . the lessee thus becomes the agent of the owner .... "; Stevens
Supply Co. v. Stamin, 41 Ga. App. 239, 152 SE. 602 (1930); Sol Abrahams & Son
Const. Co. v. Osterholm, 136 S.W.2d 86 (Mo. 1940); Rio Grande Lumber & Fuel
Co. v. Bucrgo, 41 N.M. 624, 73 P.2d 312 (1937); Bunn v. Bates, 31 Wash.2d 315, 196
P.2d 741 (1948).
4. Shreveport Armature & Elec. Works v. Harwell, 172 So. 463 (La. 1937):
"... [T]he property of the owner can never be subject to a lien for material and
labor . . . unless it is first shown that the lessee in doing the work was acting as an
agent, representative, or contractor of the owner ....
5. Jones v. E. J. Rooks & Son, 78 Ga. App. 790, 52 S.E.2d 580 (1949);
. Title of the true owner of land cannot be subiected to a lien for improvements,
unless it is shown that he expressly or impliedly consented to the contract tinder which
the improvements were made ..
"; Sandberg v. Burns, 198 Minn. 472, 270 N.V.
575 (1936); Osborne v. McGowan, 1 App. Div. 2d 924, 149 N.Y.S.2d 781 (3rd Dep't
1956); "A lien attaches when the improvemnent is made 'with the consent' of the owner";
Wilson's Plumbing Shop on Wheels v. Trustees of )artmouth College, 168 Misc. 376,
6 N.Y.S.2d 671 (1938).
6. Florida's Act (see note I supra) illustrates this type statute. See notes 4 & 5
supra for cases decided tinder this type statute. Cf. Masterbilt Corp. v. S. A. Ryan Motors,
Inc., 149 Fla. 644, 6 So.2d 818 (1942).
7. The New York statute is typical: "A ...
laborer for) materialmen . . . who
performs labor or furishes materials for the improvement of real property with the
consent or at the request of the owner thereof . . . shall have a lien ..
" N. Y. STAT.,
c. 33, § 3 (1956). See note 5 supra for cases decided under this type statute.
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of landlord and tenant. 8 Furthermore, in the absence of provisions in the
lease requiring improvements, the mere consent of the lessor does not constitute the lessee the agent of the lessor." On the other hand, under the
consent type statute, the lien may be allowed against the estate of the
lessor where he merely consents to the improvements.'0 However, where
the terms of the lease require or obligate the lessee to make improvements
of a permanent character, such provisions are generally held to constitute
the lessee the agent of the lessor under the contract type," or to constitute consent by the lessor under the consent type statute." -' Where the
improvements are merely "authorized" by the provisions of the lease, it
is generally held that such authorization does not render the lessee the
agent of the lessor;' 3 but under the consent type statutes, authorization may

be sufficient to bind the lessor's interest.

4

Although the lease involved in the instant case appears not uncommon,
the construction of the lease herein presented under the Mechanics' Lien
Act ,' 5 gave rise to a case of first impression. The lease did not specifically
require, nor did it expressly authorize, the lessee to improve the premises.
At most "it is apparent from a reading of the lease' 8 that the parties [merely] contemplated . . a permanent improvement to be made .. ."1 at some
8. Masterbilt Corp. v. S. A. Ryan Motors, Inc., 149 H-a. 644, 6 So.2d 818 (1942);
Bunt v. Roberts, 76 Idaho 158, 279 P.2d 629 (1955): "A tenant or lessee is not generally considered the agent of lessor . . . merely by virtue of the relationship of landlord
and tenant."; Donkle & Webber Lumber Co. v. Relhnsan, 310 Ill. App. 17, 33 N.E.2d
709 (1941); Masterson v. Roberts, 336 Mo. 158, 78 S.W.2d 856 (1934); Rio Grande
Lumber & Fuel Co. v. Buergo, 41 N.M. 624. 73 P.2d 312 (1937); Burn v. Bates, 31
Wash.2d 315, 196 P.2d 741 (1948).
9. Masterbilt Corp. v. S. A. Ryan Motors, Inc., 149 Fla. 644, 6 So.2d 818 (1942);
"The consent of the owner for the improvements . .. did not confer on or grant to
the (lienor] the authority to do the work .
." see also Donald v. Heigel Lumber Co., 187
Ark. 1014, 63 S.W.2d 646 (1933); Sol Abrahams & Son Const. Co. v. Osterholm. 136
S.W.2d 86 (Mo. 1940).
10. See note 5 supra.
11. See note 3 supra. The cases cited in footnote 4 supporting the agency relationship of lessor-lessee, dealt with leases in which the lessee was required to improve
the premises.
12. See note 5 sumra. Cf. Leon Decorating Co. v. Fifth Ave. Realty Corp., 191
Misc. 89, 76 N.Y.S.2d 652 (1st Dep't 1948).
13. Mulcahy Lumber Co. v. Ohland, 44 Ariz. 301, 36 P.2d 579 (1934); Bengal
v. Madison Corp., 29 Wash.2d 779, 189 P.2d 480 (1948). See 79 A.L.R. 962 at 969;
163 A.L.R. 992 at 997.
14. "The unconditional authorization contained in the words of the lease giving
the lessee the right to erect improvements . . . require that it be found that the lessor
had 'consented' to the improvement". Osborne v. McGowan, I App. Div.2d 924, 149
N.Y.S.2d 781 (3rd Dep't 1956). In Cescheidt & Co. v. Bowery Savings Bank, 278 N.Y.
472, 15 N.E.2d 68 (1938) the lease gave approval to certain specific alterations but none
without the lessor's consent. It was held that a lien existed against the lessor for only the
work authorized by the lease.
15. See note I supra.
16. Article IV(A) of the 99 year lease requires payment of all taxes "on the land
and all buildings, fixtures and improvements now or hereafter thereon." Article VI provides that the "lessors shall have a first lien . . . on the buildings . . . placed upon the
premises. . .. ." Article VII(A) provides that the lessee will "...
keep all buildings
and ixnprovments . . . insured ..
" Article XI, entitled "Lessee's obligation to Build"
uses the term "may" in reference to any building the lessee may propose to erect.
17. Anderson v. Sokolic, 88 So.2d 511, 516 (Fla. 1956).
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future date. Justice Terrell, speaking for the majority, pointed out that
the Mechanics' Lien Act should be liberally construed to protect laborers
and materialmen,' 8 regardless of whether the required contract 0 is express,
implied, or mcrcly within the contemplation of the parties when drawing
the lease agreement. Under this rationalization the court held that the
lessee contracted for the improvements "'in accordance with a contract'
with the lessor whose interest in the property was then subject to the
mechanics' and materialmen's Iiens.'' a
A well considered dissent-' points out that the lessee was not obligated
to improve and, therefore, a contract could not properly be implied.'' In
a recent case,2'- the court construed the same statutory provision "to make
the lessor's interest in property liable for any construction work done by
the lessee only if the lease agreement required the lessee ...to effect the
improvements involved. An acquiescence on the part of the lessor to the
improvement [did] not render the interest of the lessor liable."' 4 Moreover, in an earlier ease, -a the court held that written consent by the lessor
authorizing the lessee to improve did not confer on the lienor the authority
to do the work in the absence of any requirement or authorization to improve contained in the lease or in a written agreement between the lienor
and lessor or lessee. The instant case obviously departs from the above two
decisions in that a mere contemplation of improvements is now sufficient
to burden the lessor's interest with mechanics' liens.
Although the decision in the principal case reaches an equitable result,
it is submitted that the majority has extended the scope of the Mechanics'
Lien Act provision here involved,-" beyond that logically intended
by the legislature. The lessor's liability has been expanded accordingly.
To avoid unanticipated consequences, leases (especially long term leases)
should evince clearly what the parties' intentions were with regard to improvements and repairs.
CARL G. PAFFENDORF
iS. "lien Laws like that in question wcte designed to protect laborers and materialthen and should he liberally construed to accomplish that purpose." Robert L. Weed,
Architect, Inc. v. Homing, 159 Fal. 847, 33 So.2d 648 (1947).
19. See note 1 supra.
20. Cf. Denniston & Partridge Co. v. Romp, 244 Iowa 204, 56 N.W.2d 601 (1953).
21. Anderson v. Sokolik, 88 So.2d 511, 515 (Fla. 1956).
22. Justice Drew in construing the statute states, "The manifest purpose of this
specific provision of the statute is to limit the extent and the conditions under which
liens may attach to the lessor's real property through acts of another so that the lessor at
the time of the contract may determine, delineate, prescribe and limit the risk involved;
and, if he so desires, take steps to protect his property against such liens by performance
bonds, indemnity bonds or otherwise." Id. at 516.
23. Brenner v. Smullian, 84 So.2d 44 (Fla. 1956).
24. Tlie original lease in the Brenner case did not require or authorize the lessee
to alter the premises, but by subsequent agreements between the original lessor and the
lessee, the improvements were not only authorized but the details and the extent thereof
were agreed upon between the lessor and the lessee.
25. Masterbilt Corp. v. S. A. Ryan Motors, Inc., 149 Fla. 644, 6 So.2d 818 (1942).
26. See note 1 supra.

